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Abstract
This paper uses information from a panel of Dutch ¯rms to investigate the
labor productivity e®ects of performance related pay (PRP). We ¯nd that
PRP increases labor productivity at the ¯rm level with about 9%.
Keywords: performance related pay, labor productivity
JEL-codes: C41, H55, J64, J65
¤Corresponding author; department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER, Institute for
Labor Studies (OSA); P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg; email: a.c.gielen@uvt.nl; Tel. +31 13 466
3216; fax: +31 13 466 3042.
yInstitute for Labor Studies (OSA), Tilburg University; email: m.j.m.kerkhofs@uvt.nl
zDepartment of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER, IZA and CEPR; email:
vanours@uvt.nl.
This paper is spin-o® of a research project on the relationship between performance related pay
and labor productivity funded by the Dutch Ministry of Social A®airs and Employment. The
authors thank OSA, the Institute for Labor Studies, for the use of their data.1 Introduction
Over the past decade in the Netherlands the use of performance-related pay (PRP)
has increased substantially (Table 1). Whereas in 1995 30% of the ¯rms used PRP,
this was 39% in 2001. The increased popularity of PRP-schemes may be due to
the increase in labor productivity caused by the schemes. PRP may stimulate labor
productivity for two reasons. First, in situations of asymmetric information about
worker's abilities or e®ort a PRP-scheme can be used to induce workers to exert
the right amount of e®ort (see for example Prendergast (1999) and Lazear (2004)).
Second, when hiring new workers, piece rates can be used as a screening mechanism
to encourage only the most able workers to apply (Lazear, 1986).
PRP-schemes can be either individual performance pay schemes, such as piece
rate wages, or collective performance pay schemes, such as pro¯t sharing. In case of
teamwork individual performance is di±cult to measure, hence there is an incentive
to free-ride. In such a case, group-based incentive schemes may have little e®ect
on individual productivity. Additionally, perverse incentives may arise in case of
multitasking. When employees are required to perform several tasks, they will focus
only on those activities being rewarded and neglecting other activities. Therefore
it is not always clear that PRP-schemes indeed increase productivity. Nevertheless,
recent empirical studies do ¯nd evidence in support of PRP increasing productiv-
ity, although the size of the e®ect di®ers substantially. Whereas Cahuc and Dor-
mont (1997) for example ¯nd a mild increase in productivity due to pro¯t sharing
arrangements of about 2% for French ¯rms, Lazear (2000) ¯nds that piece rates
cause productivity to increase with about 40% for U.S. ¯rms, half of which is due
2to an increase of the productivity of the incumbent workforce (\incentive") and half
of which is due to the in°ow of high-productivity workers (\sorting").1
The increased popularity of PRP-schemes in the Netherlands is not caused by
evidence about productivity e®ects. As far as we know this is the ¯rst paper that
presents an analysis of the PRP-productivity e®ects in Dutch ¯rms. We investigate
the determinants of the use of PRP-schemes but our focus is on the productivity
gain of ¯rms that adopt PRP-schemes (or productivity losses of ¯rms which abolish
PRP-schemes). In our analysis we account for potential selectivity of PRP-adoption,
i.e. the case in which more pro¯table ¯rms are more likely to introduce performance
related pay. Our results indicate that PRP indeed increases productivity substan-
tially.
2 Data
The OSA Labor Demand Panel is a biennial longitudinal panel survey among es-
tablishments with at least 5 employees.2 The data we use are from four consecutive
waves and cover the period 1995-2001. In our data 794 establishments are observed
twice, 288 three times, 84 four times, which gives us a sample of 1166 ¯rms with
2788 observations. The dataset comprises all industries, but the sample is strati¯ed
with respect to the area of economic activity and ¯rm size.3
1The empirical literature shows that generally pro¯t sharing arrangement have smaller produc-
tivity e®ects than piece rate schemes. This may have to do with piece rate schemes being applicable
only in situations in which individual output can be monitored and free-riding is not an issue.
2In this paper we will use the terms establishment and ¯rm interchangeably to describe the
unit of analysis.
3As the OSA panel is a strati¯ed sample with unequal sampling rates, sampling weights are
applied to obtain ¯gures that are representative for Dutch establishments with 5 or more employees.
3For each wave of the panel we know whether or not a PRP scheme is active.
Additionally, the dataset contains information on sales and production costs, which
allows the construction of a measure of per capita value added for each establishment.
3 Parameter estimates
3.1 Determinants of PRP
Table 1 provides some stylized facts on the presence of PRP. As shown especially
larger ¯rms have increased the use of PRP-schemes. Whereas in 1995 29% of the
¯rms with more than 100 employees had a PRP-scheme, this increased to 53% in
2001. Although there is quite some variation in the use of PRP-schemes according
to the size of the ¯rm, there is even more variation across industry. Whereas in
health care and education only about 10% of the establishments had a PRP-scheme
this is about 55% in construction.
Estimates on the presence of PRP in ¯rms using our data as a pooled cross
section indicate that PRP schemes are more likely to be adopted in large ¯rms and
in the construction sector.4 In industries where output is di±cult to measure, e.g.
health care sector, PRP schemes are less likely to be adopted. Furthermore, during
the late 1990s the use of PRP schemes has increased.
To correct for potential selection e®ects, a logit model is estimated accounting
for ¯rm ¯xed e®ects: Pr(rit = 1) = ¤(®i + ¯xit) and Pr(rit = 0) = ¤(¡®i ¡
¯xit), where r indicates whether or not a ¯rm has a PRP scheme, x is a vector
4These estimates using a binomial logit model are not presented, but are available on request.
In the pooled cross-section estimates we also ¯nd that PRP schemes are more likely to be present
in ¯rms with a high share of employees covered by a collective agreement and in ¯rms with a high
share of white collar workers.
4of explanatory variables including ¯rm size and calendar year, ¤ is an indicator of
the logistic cumulative distribution function, i refers to ¯rm, t refers to the year
(1995,..., 2001) and the ®i represent ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. Because of the ¯xed e®ects
many ¯rms characteristics { all non time-varying characteristics { are accounted for.
The parameters are estimated using Chamberlain's conditional likelihood method.
This means that the parameters are identi¯ed on the subset of observations for which
the dependent variable changes at least once over time.
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2. The results indicate that the
e®ect of ¯rm size is insigni¯cant. Apparently, the ¯rm size e®ect is more a cross-
sectional phenomenon than a direct causal e®ect. There is a clear increase in the
use of PRP over time.
3.2 Labor productivity e®ects of PRP
In this section we determine the e®ect of PRP on labor productivity. Labor pro-
ductivity is calculated as follows: yit = sit ¤ (1 ¡ mit)=nit, where s represents sales
(denoted in 1995 Dutch guilders), m the percentage of costs in sales, and n the
number of employees of the ¯rm. As the dependent variable we use the natural
logarithm of yit and as explanatory variables we have the presence of PRP, ¯rm
size and calendar year. In the analysis we include ¯rm ¯xed e®ects to control for
selectivity in the use of PRP schemes. The parameter estimates are presented in
the second column of Table 2. It appears that PRP schemes increase productivity
with 9.0%. Furthermore, ¯rm size has a negative e®ect on productivity5, while ¯rms
become more productive over time.
5The negative e®ect of ¯rm size in the panel analysis is most likely a short term e®ect. If ¯rms
expand their workforce in the short run productivity goes down.
5We performed a number of sensitivity analyzes to investigate the robustness of
the PRP productivity e®ect. We started with ignoring the ¯rm ¯xed e®ects and
did a pooled cross-section analysis, as if we have no panel data. If no panel data
are available it is impossible to distinguish between the incentive e®ects of PRP
and spurious correlation between PRP and productivity that will typically arise if
more productive ¯rms are more likely to adopt a PRP scheme. As a result of this
potential endogeneity of the PRP variable the estimated e®ect of PRP would be
biased upwards. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, in the pooled cross-section the PRP-
productivity e®ect is estimated as 12.4%.6 We also estimated a model in which the
¯rm speci¯c e®ects were included as random e®ects. This speci¯cation implicitly
assumes that PRP can be treated as an exogenous variable in the sense that PRP-
adoption is not related to ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics that are related to higher
productivity. As in the pooled regression, the e®ect of PRP will be overestimated
if PRP-adoption is subject to endogenous selection. This expectation is con¯rmed.
Testing the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation against the random e®ects speci¯cation, we
¯nd that the ¯xed e®ects model is to be preferred.7
Furthermore, we noticed that there was a lot of variation in the reported sales
¯gures indicating potential measurement errors. In order to reduce measurement
errors we excluded observations with a large change in sales between two panel
observations. We used an indicator variable z de¯ned as zit = ln(sit)¡ln(si) where
si is the average sales of ¯rm i over the time period available. First, we remove
6In these estimates we ¯nd that large ¯rms are more productive than small ¯rms. Apparently
in the long run productivity are positively correlated with the size of the workforce.
7The Hausman test of the random e®ects speci¯cation against the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation is
100.95. This is a Â2-test with 5 degrees of freedom and ¯rmly rejects the random e®ects speci¯cation
indicating that the ¯rm speci¯c e®ects are correlated with the PRP variable.
6observations for which jzitj > 1. This reduces the sample size but does not a®ect the
productivity e®ect of PRP in the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation. Applying a more strict
criterion of removing observations for which jzitj > 0:5 does not change the results
either.
Finally, we re-estimated the model correcting for the average number of working
hours in the ¯rm. Hence, we used an indicator of productivity per hour worked.
This leads to less accurate estimates for two reasons. First, the information on the
working hours is available only for a limited number of ¯rms. Second, the average
number of hours is rather imprecise as it is measured in categories. As shown, now
the PRP-parameter is estimated with less precision but, as shown in the bottom
line of Table 3, still signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at 10%.
All in all, we conclude from our sensitivity analysis that the estimated produc-
tivity e®ect of PRP of 9% is quite robust.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of the productivity e®ects of PRP at the ¯rm level.
We ¯nd that the introduction of PRP increases labor productivity with about 9%.
To the extent that ¯rms are aware of this it is clear why ¯rms increasingly adopt
PRP schemes. Our results are quite robust. The ¯xed e®ects approach proves to be
useful for modeling the causal e®ect of PRP on productivity. To substantiate the
estimated e®ect it would be worth applying the model to data that contain more
detailed information about the types of PRP-schemes and the characteristics of
workers involved, information that may be available from linked employer-employee
data.
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8Table 1: Presence of performance related pay in Dutch ¯rms
(%)
No. of
1995 1997 1999 2001 ¯rms
Total 30 35 40 39 2788
By ¯rm size
<25 32 36 40 35 1037
25{50 29 36 33 49 376
51{100 21 31 46 48 399
>100 29 29 40 53 976
By industry
Manufacturing, agriculture 30 34 38 45 738
Construction 44 56 56 55 308
Trade 36 36 45 41 255
Transportation 16 14 20 39 83
Financial services 31 42 44 36 242
Health care 13 6 7 10 594
Other services 21 29 25 35 137
Government 47 48 40 38 225
Education 14 8 13 9 206
No. of ¯rms 763 932 724 369 2788
Source: OSA Labor Demand Survey. Sampling weights are used to
create numbers that are representative for ¯rm establishments with at
least 5 workers.
9Table 2: Parameter estimates
Presence of PRP Labor productivity
PRP { 0:090 (0:042)¤¤
ln(¯rm size) 0:397 (0:266) ¡0:881 (0:048)¤¤
1997 0:128 (0:144) 0:130 (0:031)¤¤
1999 0:521 (0:181)¤¤ 0:164 (0:037)¤¤
2001 0:688 (0:225)¤¤ 0:160 (0:048)¤¤
Observations 895 2788
Firms 356 1166
Note: Presence of PRP: logit model; Labor productivity:
linear regression; all estimates contain ¯rm ¯xed e®ects;
standard errors in parentheses, a ** indicates that the co-
e±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5% level of signi¯cance;
reference year is 1995.
10Table 3: Sensitivity analysis
PRP parameter No. of observations
Baseline estimate 0:090(0:042)¤¤ 2788
Pooled cross-section 0:124(0:044)¤¤ 2788
Random E®ects 0:178(0:039)¤¤ 2788
No outliers (jzitj < 1) 0:089(0:041)¤¤ 2775
No outliers (jzitj < 0:5) 0:091(0:039)¤¤ 2665
Hourly productivity 0:156(0:088)¤ 1320
Note: The baseline estimate is similar to the one presented in Table 2;
standard errors in parentheses, a ** (*) indicates that the coe±cient is
di®erent from zero at a 5% (10%) level of signi¯cance.
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